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Technology and development
Concern about technology from the point of view of
development studies has been growing consistently
since it was recognised that control of technology has
often led to the control of development, the definition
of its aims, and the determination of its pace. The
debate has, more often than not, been unduly
concentrated in three broad areas. The first has been
the characteristics of the technologies to be used,
especially, to ensure that choices correspond to
development aims and the economic and skill
endowment of a given country or region. Second has
been the mechanism of transfer of technology (licensing
agreements, use of patents, trade secrets and so on)
aimed principally at improving the conditions of the
transfer of technology for developing countries (eg
Code of Conduct). The third element has been the
development df science and technology policies to
upgrade the technical infrastructure and to encourage
innovation in developing countries.
This is by no means a comprehensive listing of all the
intricacies in technology-development debates. Its
purpose is mainly to highlight the absence of
consideration given to two equally important elements.
The first is the dynamism of technical change, which
although commonly recognised, is seldom assimilated
with all its consequences into the debate. Technology,
whether for materials, products, processes, clerical
work or communications is a constantly moving target,
so that the initial choice of technology is only the
beginning of a process of assimilation, up-grading, and
finally, innovation. However in most planning processes
technology is often regarded as given, with little
emphasis placed on trying to forecast how technological
change might alter export or import performance,
industries and raw materials. Whilst forecasting these
developments remains more a craft than a science,
this does not constitute an excuse for avoiding some
form of indicative assessment of technological
change.
The above point is closely linked to a second,
increasingly important area of development research,
namely the effects of technological change on the
international division of labour. In other words, how
do dynamic technological developments affect
comparative advantage and thus development and
industrialisation prospects in particular countries or
regions. This phenomenon is by no means a new one,
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although surprisingly little attention has been paid to
it. For example, history tells us that technological
advances in textile manufacturing changed the
international division of labour for textiles. By the
1830s, the price of yarn was perhaps one twentieth of
what it had been 50 years earlier, and the cheapest
Hindu labour could not compete in either quality or
quantity with Lancashire's mules and throstles L Landes
1976:421. Similarly, the commercialisation of the Haber-
Bosh nitrogen fixation process in the l920s did away
with one of Chile's most important sources of external
revenue, the exploitation of natural nitrate. At one
point, Chile supplied at least two-thirds of the world's
nitrate requirements and the tax on exports was 80 per
cent of Chile's total revenue.
The historical listing of such technological develop-
ments and their effects on the international division of
labour takes us to several countries and continents
and includes, among other things, the substitution of
natural by artificial processes in the production of
rubber (which has in fact rebounded due to increased
oil prices and performance requirements), fibres,
colorants, certain minerals and the current tendency
of partially substituting alternative energy sources for
oil. Most of these are based on high, capital intensive
technology.
In a more speculative vein, and looking at the future
rather than the past, several questions could be posed
in the light of current and imminent technological
change:
widespread experiments (and even some pilot
plants) are underway to produce industrial glucose
and sweeteners out of cellulose through the use of
genetically engineered micro-organisms. If these
experiments prove to be commercially viable, what
will be the effect on sugar demand and prices, and
on the revenues of sugar producers?
Copper has been substituted in a number of
applications in the past, such as by aluminium for
power transmission. It is now facing further
substitution in other areas, such as by fibre optics in
the field of telecommunications. This is not going to
be a sudden development but an evolutionary one,
over a period of years. Will this affect the aggregate
demand for copper and eventually its price?
-
5
The first example deals with biotechnology, or more
specifically, with the latest developments in genetic
engineering whose consequences for the international
division of labour remain largely unexplored. The
time horizon for commercial developments are
commonly acknowledged to be between five (some
new pharmaceutical products) to 20 years (applications
for mining processes) although some products are
already available ICongress of the United States, Office
of Technology Assessment 19811.
The second deals with substitution of materials, where
considerable research has already been done. But the
prospects for new human-engineering materials which
are presently used for sophisticated applications make
an increase in the rate of this research likely.
This interaction between technological change and
the international division of labour does not only
affect the North-South division of labour, but also that
among developed countries. A classical and often
quoted example has been the substitution of precision
engineering by electronic components in the
watch/clock industry, which has led to the transfer of
a substantial part of the industry from the traditional
producer, Switzerland, to Japan and the USA. Today,
Japan is the biggest watch/clock producer in the
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world. Of additional interest in this case is that these
changes in product, which inevitably lead to changes
in processes, also forced a shift in the supplies of
materials, sales force and marketing structure. The
bulk of watches/clocks left the specialised shops to
find new outlets in supermarkets and general stores.
Development models
The complexity of the interaction between technology
and the international division of labour makes it
difficult to generalise about trends. Indeed a number
of theories have been developed from several points
of view, including the product-process cycle and factor
intensity (ie labour-intensity vs capital intensity)
explanations. Out of these two sets of theories a
'model' of the international division of labour has
evolved. Put simply, this 'model' assumes that
developing countries will develop and industrialise
through the transfer of production of simpler and
labour intensive products to them, while advanced
countries will move up-market through more R and D
and knowledge-intensive production. This view is
implicit in the basic assumptions of the New
International Economic Order, the Third World
industrialisation programme of UN agencies such as
UNIDO, and the Brandt Report.
Labour intensive assembly of non-electronic clocks and waiche
However it does not adequately consider the interaction
between mature, semi-mature and advanced tech-
nologies. A mature technology could receive a
substantial shot in the arm by developments in other,
apparently unrelated areas of technologies, and acquire
a new dynamism. For example, despite considerable
talk, and work, on the 'readjustment' of the industrial
structure of the developed countries, they remain the
most important steel producers, ship-builders, car-
manufacturers and even textile producers. These
industries were thought to be natural candidates to go
'South', but through innovation in processes and
products some have remained viable in high-wage
economies. Many factors enter into play here, the
most significant being the changing technological
profile of traditional industries. This shift in
technological profile does not only diminish the
importance of direct labour cost in total manufacturing
costs but also permits a chain of improvements in
terms of quality, turn-around-time, customer service,
stock management, office productivity and so on. In
some cases, an improvement in the 'customer service'
content of a given product is far more important than
its actual manufacturing cost.
In addition, in some areas, market fragmentation (a
characteristic of high income markets) is accompanied
by specialisation with a heavy technological content.
A good example here is in the electronics sector
where in the area of memories or microprocessors one
generation (for most applications) replaces rather
than overlaps another. For instance, 4 bit micro-
processors represented 100 per cent of the world
microprocessor market in 1972, 23 per cent in 1980
and will account for only six per cent in 1985.
(Projections of Creative Strategies International 1981.)
The situation is similar for memories, with a new
generation replacing the old in cycles of about eight
years covering first introduction, peak and obso-
lescence.
Thus it is only natural that as markets grow so do the
number of specialised niches. These products niches
need to be highly specialised in order to offer features
which truly justify their existence. In electronics again,
success in these specialised sub-markets is conditioned
by high technology content rather than because firms
concetrate on stable products, and this occurs in both
products (eg Uncommitted Logic Arrays) and processes
(eg equipment). Although it is not possible to generalise
from the experience of one sector, one should bear in
mind that what is important about electronics is not
just changes in the industiy itself, but the fact that it is
becoming a convergence industry. It is indispensable
for a growing number of sectors' activities and services
in which the content and format of information flows
are changing. The entire industrial and service structure
is thus moving toward a higher technological profile,
with an ever-increasing emphasis on streamlining the
production of software through the use of more
firmware (which writes software into electronic
components) and increasing modularity. These in
turn, will accelerate the process of change.
The context of current technological
change
The wider context in which current change takes
place is one of slow growth, and there are no signs that
this will change in the foreseeable future. Under these
types of conditions, two effects are relevant to this
discussion. The first is that slow growth encourages,
or in some cases, forces innovation in order to optimise
the use of resourcesthus the investment rationale is
much more cost-drive than growth-driven. This is not
to say that slow growth is the cause of an upsurge in
innovation which as a process is far more complex
than that. What it does mean is that the general
conditions are more conducive to innovations (and
their diffusion) than to increased production with
stable technologies and products. The second
consequence of low growth is greater competition,
particularly on an international scale, which in turn
creates political conditions for re-adjustment.
The globalisation of competition, particularly among
multinational companies, and the upsurge of innovation
constitutes a mixture which is increasingly conditioning
the international division of labour. For instance, the
nature of current technological change, especially
information technology in its broader sense, deals
with an area which by and large has remained
unchanged since the 19th century, namely the office.
The increase in office productivity or the streamlining
of administrative activities to reduce 'overhead' cost is
essential if companies are going to remain competitive.
This shift in the way information is conceptualised
opens completely new avenues that need to be explored.
The transition of information from a purely
organisational and cultural resource towards consider-
ing it as an economic resource implies that growing
attention will be paid to the 'information intensity' of
goods and services as a feature of the structure of
developed societies. This also implies the rationalisation
of 'information activities' as happened in previous
epochs with regard to manufacturing and agricultural
work.
Some general features of contemporary
technological change
In the context described above, some general features
of current technological developments can be
tentatively foreseen. These generalisations are intended
to contribute towards conceptualising the nature of
current change, and they are inevitably, at this early
stage, tentative in nature. Three categories will be
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mentioned here: the importance of science, the
increasing dependence of production on capital, and
the changing nature of information. In the final section
we will discuss them in relation to the electronics
sector.
a) The importance of science
One of the salient features of current and impending
technological change is that its origin and early
developments have been based on basic scientific
research. This is true for semiconductor technology,
biotechnology and is also becoming evident with regard
to developments in materials-technology I see Braun
and MacDonald 1978; Metropolis et al 1980; Editors
of Electronics 1981; Gros et al 1979; Congress of the
United States 19811. As the theoretical content of
technology grows, so does the skill mix required to
absorb and develop technology. At the same time
comparative advantages are conditioned by the
science/technology endowment of a given country. In
this sense, comparative advantages are deriving more
from human activity and organisation than from nature
(eg raw materials). In other words, production of
goods and services is becoming more geographically
independent as technology progresses.
These developments in the field of technology have
another important characteristic which is relevant to
our discussionthe need for sinergy. Today an
innovation is seldom the result of developments in a
single field. On the contrary, it tends to be a composite
of many disciplines, some coming from seemingly
unrelated areas. Examples of this type of sinergy are
developments in genetic engineering which would not
have been possible without computers; whilst
development in computing would not have been
possible without important breakthroughs in crystal-
lography, metallurgy, and many other areas.
Consequently technology and its transfer is increasingly
dependent on what is loosely called 'intangible
knowledge'. This type of knowledge is not necessarily
embodied in individuals but is rather the result of
organisational systems and interaction. Two examples
which have been clearly identified come to mind. The
first is in the semiconductor industry where the use of
patents, although normally practised, is not of great
strategic value to companies. The industry relies much
more heavily on trade secrets and a form of
'organisational knowledge' [Sterling, Hobe Corporation
1978; Kaplinsky 19821. The high mobility of personnel
in the industry, especially the transfer of entire teams,
constitutes a more direct problem to companies than
the infringement of patents. The second example is
software which is in many cases not patented precisely
in order to avoid disclosure of information that would
make it easy to copy. In the field of genetic engineering
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a similar process seems to be taking place as research
in this area moves from academia to industry.
Due to the elements mentioned we encounter two
important implications for the international division
of labour. The first is that the growing theoretical
content of technology makes its transfer difficult,
given the techno-scientific infrastructure of most
developing countries. The second is the increasing
'embodiment' of technology into goods and services.
This is due to the growing importance of 'intangible
knowledge' and the incorporation of functions and
features into products and equipment. For instance,
when precision mechanical components are replaced
by electronic devices (eg watches, instruments, etc)
this process of embodiment of technology takes place
since functions performed in the past by separate
elements are combined in a single circuit which in
itself is a system rather than a component.
The trend towards systems rather than discrete
components makes the absorption of technology by
stages or parts (explicit in the concept of unpackaging
technology) more difficult. At the same time, because
of technological and commercial pressures, manufac-
turers of all kinds are moving towards total systems,
with the service component incorporated. A well
known example here has been the 'turn-key plants' in
manufacturing, but one could add transport, banking
and manufacturing systems. The trend is towards
integration, which has partly been made possible by
the characteristics and economy of information
technology and microelectronics.
b) The dependence of production on capital
The second main feature is that production is
increasingly the result of capital. This general statement,
which describes a long historical trend, needs some
refinement. Historically, the best example is agriculture,
which through capital intensive labour- and land-
saving technology, increased productivity tremendously
over time. The developed countries are today the
largest producers of agricultural goods, with only a
fraction of their popualtion employed in the sector
(typically, between three and ten per cent of the
working population).
The diffusion of any technology is dependent on its
factor-saving characteristics whether labour, capital,
materials, time or a combination of all of these. For
our purpose one aspect is of particular importance
here, and this is the labour-saving effect or, in other
words, the decreasing importance of direct labour
cost in total manufacturing and business cost. The
debate in this topic in the last few years has been
massive, and consensus seems to exist on one point at
least that while there are labour saving effects at some
levels, particularly in unskilled and semi-skilled
manufacturing activities, at the same time there has
been an increased demand for skilled labour in design,
R and D and knowledge-intensive activities. This is
only natural since automation at this stage of its
development is increasingly dependent upon these
skills.
Without entering too deeply into the debate on the
choice of techniques, what is of interest from the point
of view of the international division of labour is that
the labour saving bias of new technology precisely
affects jobs which were thought to be most suitable for
developing countries. This argument has often caused
confusion, as if one were suggesting that labour cost is,
or will be irrelevant, or that developing countries will
become a sort of industrial desert. Three points should
be made in this respect and some of them I hope to
illustrate later through the example of the semi-
conductor industry. The first is that the term 'developing
country' is short-hand for a tremendous variety of
structures and development strategies. Thus, for
countries with large internal markets (eg India, Brazil,
Mexico) the effects of technology, and also their
capacity to negotiate technology, is quite different
from those with small markets or with an export-led
development strategy. Second, research on the
international division of labour, particularly in relation
to the future of off-shore activities, has concentrated
to a great extent on the relocation of plants because of
the nature of technology. These types of activity
involved few countries and few industrial sectors and
the conclusions do not necessarily apply to the impact
of technology in countries that have followed a different
strategy, nor with regard to the individual sectors
which were considered to be potential candidates to
relocate in the 'South'. This points out the need for
further research, but at the same time it should be
clearly recognised that what happens is that labour
cost becomes less of a constraint for production (in as
much as the relative share of fixed-costs increase, in
some cases substantially) and not because labour costs
become irrelevant.
What this says is that the industrialisation alternatives
for developing countries are becoming narrower and
more complex. A third clarification refers to changes
in markets as producers emphasise quality of products
and innovation in order to compete in conditions of
low growth. This in itself changes the requirements of
production in terms of the type and skill-mix required.
The changes in markets should not be underestimated,
especially because they shorten the time span of
individual product cycles, often forcing structural
changes and specialisation in industry.
c) Information
A final general feature, which I do not propose to go
into in detail here, is the growing importance of
information as an economic resource, or the growing
'information intensity' of goods and services. The fact
that electronic components, computers and, increas-
ingly, telecommunications operate in the same language
opens the way to a new type of social and economic
infrastructure. There are essentially two trends forcing
changes here. One is the ever-growing amount of
information that needs to be collected, processed and
retrieved, and the other is changes in technology
which reduce the cost and increase the reliability and
flexibility of processing information.
This process, which has been called 'informatisation'
of society, is one which simply accounts for the fact
that in order to produce a good or a service, much
more information is required than in the past. This is
because research intensity, coordination, marketing
and other business needs with a heavy information
content, are growing. From the point of view of the
international division of labour at least two aspects are
of great importance here.
The first refers to the process of rationalisation and
automation of office work which will increase overall
business productivity while augmenting fixed cost. In
this respect little is known about how these processes
rapidly underway in the developed countries will
affect comparative advantages. Whilst in the past
technology has essentially been oriented to production
processes, whether in the primary or secondary sector,
what is now required is a broader view which recognises
that productivity growth is increasingly dependent on
information and clerical activities. In many industries
already, the majority of the labour force is employed
in clerical and professional activities rather than on
the 'shop-floor'. The economic availability of
information technology now makes it possible to address
systematically the question of office productivity.
Changes in this area, by altering relative factor cost,
will undoubtedly affect location and investment
patterns.
The second aspect, of more immediate concern, is the
concentration of 'information intensive' sectors in
some developed countries. These sectors involve time
sharing services, consulting, data bases and banks,
design processes, R and D, software developments
and other types of services (eg banking). This is not
only a question of concentration of service activities
(in the 'tertiary sector' sense) but more importantly,
concerns an increase in the service content of material
production. In many areas it is no longer feasible
merely to produce an itemit is also necessary to
provide with it after sales service, repair, maintenance
and the compatibility for upgrading.
The case of software is an example here. In the total
cost of software over its entire product cycle,
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maintenance constitutes 60-80 per cent of total cost,
and development 20-40 per cent. For maintenance,
however, a vast service network is required with a
close contact with end-users. The bulk of the revenue
during the cycle of the product software is then the
'service' of it rather than the original production. (This
of course is not applicable to packaged software or
dedicated machines.) Similar changes are forecast in
the case of programmable machine tools where the
provision of software, its maintenance and a connection
with 'machining data bases' (MDB) or 'computer aided
design' (CAD) systems might be essential. As has
happened with computers, it is likely that the overall
cost of manufacturing tools and machinery will be
more dependent on the 'service' content of the goods
rather than on the 'hardware'. Therefore, the process
of concentration of 'information intensive' activities
involves many old and new types of services as well as
the 'informatisation' of material goods. With the
changing technological profile of productive activities
the gap in this area between developed and developing
countries is most likely to increase if judged only by
the projected expenditure in establishing informatics
infrastructures. The issues involved in this area are
extremely broad, ranging from questions of telecom-
munication agreements and use of satellites to the
economically and politically difficult issue of
Transborder Data Flow.
Some elements of the three main aspects mentioned
above can be explored through the specific case of the
semiconductor industry, which provides an important
illustrative case of these trends due to its heavy
technological content and the fact that it has been
most extensively used in assembly plants in developing
countries. At the same time progress in semiconductors
is deeply conditioning trends in other industries, ranging
from consumer and professional electronics to heavy
capital goods. The intention in the next section is not
to explore all aspects conditioning industry behaviour,
but only those specifically affecting location and
investment patterns. For reasons of space, one aspect
of great interest in the case of this industry, namely
technological behaviour, will be omitted.
The semiconductor industry
From the point of view of investment and location the
main factors conditioning behaviour in the semi-
conductor industry are company structure, firm strategy
and the characteristics of the national economic system.
This statement is applicable to semi-captive and
merchant (selling in the open market) producers rather
than captive producers which operate with different
rationales (ie IBM or Western Electric). In terms of
the structure of the industry some important changes
have taken place, particularly in the US industry since
1977. While in the early 1970s the industry was
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characterised by the existence of independent,
technologically innovative, big and small producers,
today the archetype seems to be vertically integrated
companies, and the independent producers have
become less prominent. By contrast, the five large
Japanese semiconductor producers and the two largest
European ones have always been vertically integrated.
Thus the USA, where the most innovative companies
have been based, has been the exception. But now,
even there, most companies have developed corporate
links or are wholly-owned subsidiaries of large
corporations. For instance, if one considers even the
US merchant market (ie those selling products in the
open market) by the equity characteristics of producers,
it looks as follows:
tbased on 1979 sales figu res
If we consider the overall activities of the 'big league'
firms we would note that some of them have themselves
become vertically integrated corporations. Thus, unlike
National Semiconductors and Intel (with over 70 per
cent of their sales concentrated in semiconductors),
the semiconductor operations of Texas Instruments
and Motorola represent only 47 and 37 per cent
respectively of total sales.
The reasons for this development in the industry are
related to three main factors discussed above, namely
capital requirements, cost of R and D and access to
technology ERada 19821. This change in structure is
accompanied by a growing number of captive and
semi-captive production facilities, especially for
integrated circuits. Automobile manufacturers, camera
producers, office equipment companies and many
others are recognising the importance of vertical
integration as a way of ensuring supplies and also of
distinguishing their final products in the market-place
by tailoring electronic components to their own needs
and systems. A sign of this trend is that in the US, 23
captive facilities were established in 1970 and 61 in
1980 [Bojert and Vieber 19811.
Thus the 'archetype' semiconductor company is
increasingly becoming a vertically integrated one as
technological and economic pressures force the
producers of components into the production of
Independent (Texas Instruments, Motorola,
National Semiconductors, Intel) 46
Subsidiaries and divisions of major corporations 16
Majority control by major corporations 19
Minority control by major corporations 6
Others (mainly small independent producers) 13
systems, and systems producers into the manufacture
of components. At the same time a risk-averting
strategy is pursued to maintain a level of innovation
and technological tie-ups that allow companies to
quickly 'ride' the learning curve and defeat or neutralise
the natural economies of scale of very large vertically
integrated TNCs.
But whilst the above may be an accurate reflection of
the mass production merchant market, it is also true
that as the market expands so do the number of
niches. So one can expect numerous new entries and
success stories in specialised circuits and equipment,
and also the subcontracting to highly specialised
companies of part of the production process.
But in this industry, perhaps more than any other,
market share needs to be heavily qualified by two
considerations. The first is by market segment where,
for example, in the case of microprocessors, Intel is on
top, mastering the most complex technology. The
second is what one might call 'technology share' which
occurs due to second sourcing. For example, American
Micro Devices (AMD) which only has about two per
cent of the total US semiconductor market, has a
much larger presence in integrated circuits. In the 4-
bit microprocessor segment, its direct share was 57
per cent (by volume), but if we consider indirect
shares, AMD accounts for 70 per cent (by volume) of
the market due to the fact that 13 per cent is second
sourced (via licences) to companies such as Fairchild,
Hitachi, NEC, Philips and Diemens. Siemens in turn
owns about 20 per cent of AMD (Creative Strategies
International 1981).
Second sourcing, equity participation, technology tie-
ups and joint research efforts all suggest that to look at
the main actors from any particular angle is necessarily
a partial view, and the greater the segmentation of the
market, the more complex the analysis of actors will
become. In addition, the conditions under which the
different companies operate varies. For instance, the
largest portion of equity in Japanese companies is held
by financial institutions or other companies, while
individuals hold a relatively low percentage as compared
with US companies. Furthermore the Japanese
industry's vertical structure affects the cost of capital
because it allows profits from one division to be used
to finance investment in another. The result of this
structure is that Japanese semiconductor companies
employ significantly higher debt ratios than US
semiconductor companies. Typically, they maintain
debt-to-capital ratios of 60-70 per cent while US
companies range between 16 and 18 per cent.
Consequently the cost of capital to Japanese
semiconductor companies is significantly lower than
that of the US companies, and this is largely a result of
the higher debt ratios employed by the Japanese. As a
result their required rate of return on investment is
lower than those of US companies. Thus, in the period
1977-79, the typical US electronic company earned
16.3 per cent on capital employed, whilst in the same
period the Japanese companies earned 7.5 per cent on
capital. (Rate of return for capital is defined here as
net operating profits after taxes as a percentage of
average total debt and equity capital employed.) As a
result of these elements, Japanese companies can
accept lower profit margins, lower rates of return on
capital and a lower cost of capital. Under these
conditions the cost pressures on Japanese producers
are different and to a large extent this explains their
emphasis on product quality through rapid automation,
which requires large outlays of capital. Thus if in the
1970s the recipe for success was volume/yields, today
it is volume/yield' /quality and in order to achieve it
more complex, expensive and automatic plants are
required.
The Japanese have come to be noted for the high
deg'ee of automation of their assembly process, with
the level of cleanliness approaching that of wafer
processing. They tend to rely more on automatic
equipment than on in-line inspection. Many changes
are also taking place on types of materials and packages
in an effort to increase quality by merging together
production and design engineering. The approach is
'hands-off' whenever possible. However it is worth
noting that the pace of automation varies for different
companies and products. For memory devices, with
high margins and a massive market, the trend to
automation is strong. For other more expensive and
low margin devices, the pace is slower, and packaging
and assembling tend to be a relatively smaller proportion
of the total cost.
Now, extensive use of automatic equipment and
expensive capital intensive plants allow producers to
reduceor at least not expandoff-shore assembly
in developing countries, which in the past has utilised
relatively labour-intensive technology. In addition the
cost of operating capital intensive plants tends to be
relatively similar, independent of location. This points
to one of the notable differences between Japanese
and US producers, which concerns the use of off-
shore plants as a major source of capacity. The data
suggest that Japanese firms do not utilise off-shore
manufacturing to support a significant percentage of
output (both by volume and value). Nevertheless
partly due to their use of automated techniques, they
are able to compete successfully on price.
The reluctance of the Japanese to rely on off-shore
plants is due to the belief that quality cannot be
assured in labour-intensive production. Their latest
significant off-shore investments are in the USA and
Europe mainly because of the need to have access to
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markets and to avoid trade friction. US companies
operating under very different conditions are forced
to follow a strategy which tends to maximise short-
term profits. Thus the constraints on cost are very
different, especially in terms of capital investment in
fully automated plants. In addition US custom
regulations (items 806.00 and 807.30) have encouraged
the use of off-shore facilities. These regulations only
tax foreign materials, and value added abroad to
imported products. However, despite the upgrading
of off-shore plants (eg, adding testing in some of them)
the value added outside the US has been consistently
declining, in the case of integrated circuits from 57 per
cent in 1974, to 39 per cent in 1978. This is due to the
increasing value of the parts of devices produced in
the USA LUS International Trade Commission
1979:14].
A comparison between the USA and Japan shows the
following:
Approximate offshore production of US and
Japanese semiconductor companies as percentage of
the value of total domestic production
1978 1979
Japan 3 3
USA 37 n&
Source: based on data from the Bank of Asia, The
Semiconductor Industry in Japan, Hong Kong 1980,
and US International Trade Commission, Competitive
Factors Influencing World Trade in Semiconductors,
Washington 1979.
'A fair assumption would be that the percentage remains the
same.
By far the largest number of off-shore plants belong to
US producers. Thus of 112 off-shore plants in 1981
assembling semiconductors, 69 per cent belong to US
companies, 12 per cent to European and 19 per cent to
Japanese producers.
In ternis of labour-cost, an item of particular importance
to US producers, wage differentials vis-à-vis off-shore
facilities remain largetypically a ratio of 1:4.
Nevertheless, if labour cost were the prime
consideration for choosing, fabricating and assembling
sites, many companies would have moved to lower
wage countries as relative wage costs have risen in
some of the more successful NICs. However, although
some movement has taken place, by and large the
industry remains in the areas of original investment.
Hence, large producers have relatively few plants in
very low wage countries such as Thailand 5, Indonesia
3 and India 3. By contrast they have 16 plants in
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Singapore, which is one of the most expensive countries
in terms of wages for assembling-type operations.
However it should be emphasised here that labour
cost has never been the only consideration for choosing
off-shore sites. There are many other elements including
infrastructure, political considerations, tax and capital
incentives and conditions for foreign investment.
These impending changes in the structure of the
industry have not entirely sunk in yet, but the process
of rationalisation and streamlining is likely to accelerate
in the next few years. The consequence of this
rationalisation will be to affect off-shore locations,
levels of employment, increased vertical integration
and capital intensity, and last but not least, the industry
will become more fiercely competitive. For example,
Siemens is slowly digesting its acquisitions and has
overlapping off-shore plants with Litronix (with which
it has recently formed equity links) in Singapore and
Malaysia, while a Litronix plant in Mauritius has been
closed. General Electric overlaps with an Intersil
plant (which it has just purchased) in Singapore. The
same pattern is applicable to many other companies in
terms of plants, sales, marketing structures, and, of
course, R and D.
In the short run, especially for smaller producers, off-
shore locations (particularly in Asia) are attractive,
since they are far less capital intensive than highly
automated domestic plants. For those with heavy
commitments overseas, such as Fairchild, automation
of some of these stages of existing off-shore operations
are only rational. But at the same time we have seen in
the last year the birth of specialised assembly companies
on-shore (eg California) with highly automated lines,
lower turnaround time and greater proximity to
customers.
Whilst smaller companies and new entrants might
turn to subcontracting assembling operations off-shore,
as well as on-shore, rather than overstretch their
managerial and financial resources with wholly-owned
operations, the fact is that the larger the company and
the more vertically integrated, (which, as we have
argued, appears to be the trend) the less the use of off-
shore plants in terms of numbers as well as size. Thus
for similar value for semiconductor sales NEC has
three off-shore plants and National Semiconductors
six: Hitachi two and Fairchild seven; Philips two and
Motorola eight. As fixed costs become larger as a
proportion of total cost and the value added in
semiconductor manufacture operations (as opposed
to assembly) grows, we shall see an acceleration of the
rationalisation in the present distribution of plans. In
addition, as quality becomes crucial for competitiveness,
assembly will change substantially with automation
and the use of clean rooms. At this point fully integrated
manufacturing plants will become more economical
than the fragmentation of production.
Three elements are, then, conditioning current changes
in semiconductors. The first is the alteration of firm
structure, due to the increasing capital and R and D
needs, including basic research, leading towards larger,
vertical integrated companies. Secondly, automation
is increasing the fixed cost of production and changing
the skill-mix in plants. This diminishes the relative
importance of low-wage direct labour cost. Thirdly,
and closely related to the second point, is the drive for
quality, which is forcing automation and the use of
highly capital-intensive plants.
Other elements that condition the use of off-shore
plants, eg tax and capital incentives, are also decreasing
in importance as many developed countries have put
into effect plans and incentives to encourage the
electronics industry and which, in some cases, might
neutralise, in relative terms, the advantage of off-
shore locations. A case in point here is Scotland and
France, both of which have been successful in either
attracting foreign investment or developing techno-
logical ties and cross-licence agreements. The largest
investments in integrated circuits (outside the
companies' own countries) have taken place in Scotland
in the last three years.
Conclusion
All the elements discussed in this article can be
summarised by one main conclusion. This is, that for
development studies, whether in the economic, social
and political field or in specific areas of human resources
and transfer of technology a very dynamic view of
technological change should be incorporated. The
complexity of the issues involved makes it necessary
to take a transdisciplinary appraoch to research and
to begin questioning very systematically some of the
basic assumptions of commonly professed development
theories. Prospective technological assessment should
become a central element in economic studies and
planning, and should deserve far more attention than
has been the case so far, especially in the context of
work on development.
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